We illustrate the welfare bene…t of tax subsidies to corporate debt …nancing. Two …rms engage in a socially wasteful competition for survival in a declining industry. Firms di¤er on two dimensions: exogenous productivity and endogenously chosen amount of debt …nancing, resulting in a two dimensional war of attrition. Debt …nancing increases incentives to exit, which, while socially bene…cial, is costly for the …rm. Therefore the planner can increase welfare by subsidizing debt …nancing. The duration of industry distress determines the tradeo¤ between the welfare bene…t illustrated in our model and the costs of subsidizing corporate debt from the existing literature. Our theory also sheds light on why the IRS considers "con ‡ict of interest" as one of the key determinants in identifying securities that are quali…ed for tax-bene…ts.
Introduction
Corporations can deduct interest payments from their pro…ts, giving rise to the so-called debt tax shield. This subsidy to debt …nancing is massive, comprising 9.7 percent of …rm value in the United States (Graham, 2000) and provides …rms with incentives to obtain …nancing through debt relative to equity. While very little research explicitly considers the welfare consequences of this subsidy, most theories suggest that if debt …nancing has externalities, they are negative (e.g., Lorenzoni, 2008) . Indeed, this belief has been the driving force behind policy proposals over the last two decades to eliminate the debt subsidy. For example, President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform recommended that the tax system should "provide a more level treatment of debt and equity …nancing for large businesses" and justi…ed it the following way: 1 "The tax bias against corporate equity encourages …rms to rely on debt more than they would if the tax system imposed no such bias. The use of higher debt levels known as "leveraging" may increase the risk of bankruptcy and …nancial distress during temporary industry or economy-wide downturns. This heightened bankruptcy risk can make the entire economy more volatile."
The backbone of these models is that temporary shocks cause bankruptcy of e¢ cient …rms.
However, as early as Schumpter (1934) economists have recognized that liquidating ine¢ cient …rms can also be important. Such liquidation redeploys assets to alternative …rms and sectors, and stops ine¢ cient further investment. This reallocation can be especially important when economies are transitioning from permanent demand and technological innovation shocks, which render some industries obsolete and at overcapacity.
Often in declining industries weak …rms do not exit as fast as is socially optimal if they engage in a war of attrition (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986) . In fact, …rms not only compete to survive, but may also continue to invest, as eloquently described by Jensen (1993) : "In industry after industry with excess capacity, managers fail to recognize that they themselves must downsize; instead they leave the exit to others while they continue to invest. When all managers behave this way, exit is signi…cantly delayed at substantial cost of real resources to society."
Our model explores the e¤ect that subsidizing debt …nancing has on …rms' exit in declining industries. We embed the classic con ‡ict of interest between equity and debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leland, 1994) into a war of attrition model. In this con ‡ict, equity holders ex post fail to internalize the bankruptcy costs that accrue to debt holders and therefore …le for bankruptcy earlier than would be optimal from the perspective of the …rm as a whole. Similar to standard models, this con ‡ict lowers …rm value. In our model, however, the con ‡ict also alleviates the socially wasteful war of attrition. Therefore, in sharp contrast to much of the previous literature, we emphasize that the con ‡ict of interest between debt and equity can be socially desirable and illustrate a bene…t of subsidizing debt. We further show that the tradeo¤ between the cost and bene…t of subsidizing debt depends on whether the shocks to the industry are temporary or permanent.
Consider the recent developments in the brick-and-mortar book retail industry. Amazon's entry had decreased demand for purchasing books in physical stores. As early as 2005 bookselling had become "a game of stealing market share from competitors" (Barron's, 2005) with two major players, Borders and Barnes and Noble. Nevertheless, neither Borders nor Barnes and Noble were reducing the number of stores they operated. For example, Borders was investing in stores for most of the 2000s (U.S. News, 2011). It was Borders'bankruptcy on February 16, 2011 that …nally signi…cantly reduced the number of stores. Barnes and Noble declined to purchase liquidated Borders stores, since 70 percent were within 5 miles of a their own stores. Instead, these stores are being converted to sell other products (The Times-Picayune, 2011). In fact, Barnes and Noble is expected to cut 10 percent of its stores in the near future (Business Week, 2011) . This suggests that the industry was operating too many stores, which were used to …ght for market share, instead of being allocated to socially e¢ cient uses. The bankruptcy of Borders terminated a costly war of attrition and increased the value of the whole industry. Our model tries to capture the forces in this example and show the role of the government subsidy of debt. 2 We start with two …rms, which engage in an asymmetric information war of attrition as in Bulow and Klemperer (1999) . The industry is at overcapacity and supports only one …rm: the presence of a …rm exerts a non pecuniary externality on the other …rm. Before the war of attrition, each …rm chooses its capital structure : equity holders raise debt in a competitive debt market. During the war of attrition equity holders can decide if they want to default by …ling for bankruptcy, which leads to liquidation. The social planner can subsidize debt by subsidizing …rms'debt repayment.
The distinguishing feature of our model is the two-dimensional type that determines …rms' e¤ective strength in the war of attrition. The …rst dimension is exogenously given productivity (i.e., real strength); and the second is endogenous amount of debt (i.e., …nancial strength). The equity holders'decision to raise more debt on the margin is based on the following tradeo¤: The direct e¤ect of increasing the promised debt payment, holding …rm's exit strategy …xed, increases the price of debt and decreases the value of equity. Because the payment to debt is tax subsidized, this increases …rm value. This is the main channel through which subsidizing debt a¤ects debt levels in equilibrium. Marginally increasing debt also has an indirect e¤ect on …rm value through 2 Personal electronics retail and video rentals are further examples of brick-and-mortar industries that had su¤ered a permanent demand shock, but only adjusted capacity after one of the major …rms went bankrupt (Circuity City, Blockbuster). Internet retailing is not the only example of disruptive innovation that generated overcapacity in an industry. The innovation from ply to radial tires increased the life span of tires three to …ve times, dramatically reducing the tire demand and leaving the industry at overcapacity (Jensen 1993) . For other examples of industries that required a signi…cant contraction see Jensen (1993) whose examples range from the cereals, whisky and tin plate industries in the late nineteenth century to defense industries after the cold war. distorting exit times. Equity holders' bene…ts from winning decrease, therefore they choose to default sooner. This results in a lower price of debt, and, since exit times are distorted, it decreases the value of the …rm. A …rm's choice of debt equalizes these two e¤ects on the margin.
We solve for exit times and debt schedule in closed-form, which are jointly determined in equilibrium. We …rst prove that, in equilibrium, more productive …rms are stronger in the war of attrition even after accounting for their debt choice. Therefore, in equilibrium, from a given …rm's point of view, its opponents type becomes e¤ectively one dimensional. This greatly improves the tractability of the model and allows us to solve for the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game.
This result also has e¢ ciency implications. One concern with subsidizing debt is that productive …rms might "over leverage" to exploit the subsidies and ex-post sometimes exit sooner than less productive …rms. Monotonicity in e¤ective strength implies that there are no ine¢ ciencies in sorting of …rms'exits: if a …rm is exiting, it must mean that any less productive …rms would have exited already.
As a benchmark, we show that in economies with no debt subsidy, …rms do not take on debt.
Although the socially optimal allocation requires that the relatively weaker …rm exits immediately, under all-equity …nancing, it will stay in the industry and engage in a socially wasteful war of attrition. A debt subsidy induces all …rms to increase their debt levels in equilibrium. As each …rm raises its debt level, its exit time shortens. This reduction in exit times is further reinforced in equilibrium. First, if any …rm lowers its equilibrium exit time, all …rms, which are more productive, respond by lowering exit times as well. Second, raising equilibrium debt levels of a given …rm results in an equilibrium increase in debt for all more productive …rms, reducing exit times further. Shorter exit times improve welfare by shortening wasteful wars of attrition and do not induce ine¢ cient sorting of …rms'exits. Therefore a planner can increase welfare through subsidizing debt.
Our model captures some of the richness in how the tax subsidy is implemented in the U.S. tax system (Section 4.1). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires that debt holders and equity holders are distinct entities, and have con ‡icting liquidation preferences, if debt is to be subsidized.
These IRS rules encourage con ‡ict of interest, which is consistent with our model if the IRS acts as a social planner. Our theory naturally delivers several intriguing patterns in the implementation of debt tax subsidy in the U.S. tax system, raising the hurdle for alternative explanations of the debt tax subsidy, especially those in which the con ‡icts of interest is always welfare destroying.
In a way, that the debt subsidy increases welfare in our model is not surprising. Our model is designed to highlight the welfare bene…ts of debt, and not the costs, which have been well understood in the literature heretofore. In an extension we show that our welfare result critically hinges on the duration of industry distress. Relative to the benchmark model, the industry recovers in the future. The time to recovery plays a critical role: if the industry recovers quickly then debt may induce more exit than is socially optimal. This modi…cation introduces the standard cost of subsidizing debt into the model, which the planner then has to trade-o¤ with the bene…ts outlined above. As the duration of industry distress increases, the bene…t of subsidizing debt rises and the cost falls. We show that while a positive subsidy to debt is optimal, raising it beyond a certain point can be welfare destroying.
In the second extension of the model we consider how asymmetric information in the …nancing stage a¤ects the problem. Unlike in the benchmark model, in addition to …rms, banks now cannot observe …rm's productivity either and must infer it from debt choices. We show that including this additional friction does not alter the basic insights of the model. A positive debt subsidy still improves welfare by shortening a costly war of attrition.
We argue that subsidizing debt generates welfare bene…ts by reducing between …rm externalities.
Coase Theorem logic suggests that government intervention may not be necessary: a third party could purchase both …rms in the industry and internalize the externality. Then wars of attrition would not arise in the …rst place. We examine this possibility and show that private information about productivity, which drives the war of attrition, also a¤ects this "Coasian" solution. In fact, adverse selection facing a potential buyer is so extensive that she incurs a loss any time she attempts to internalize externalities. This is the case even if she faces no competition, and is allowed to o¤er time varying prices for the …rms. Since the Coasian solution does not resolve the externality, there is room for the government to intervene with a debt subsidy. We do not use our model to argue that the debt subsidy is uniquely suited to reduce wars of attrition: one could conceive of more …nely tuned policies that would target only industries at over-capacity. One un-modeled potential bene…t of using the debt subsidy instead of such industrial policies is that its broad based nature is less subject to regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971 ).
Our theory, which gives one potential explanation for the use and implementation of debt tax subsidies in practice, takes a view that debt …nancing can result in positive externalities through creative destruction (Schumpter, 1934; and recently, Jovanovic and Tse, 2006) . In contrast, most leading theories on incomplete …nancial markets focus on the negative externality of debt when …rms su¤er temporary shocks. 3 Our approach is complementary to this literature. Instead of focusing on temporary shocks to productivity, we focus on permanent shocks, where the economy experiences permanent technological or demand shocks that leave some industries obsolete.
Debt …nancing has many potential bene…ts. For instance, that debt constrains potentially ine¢ cient investment on the level of an individual …rm has been recognized in the theoretical literature as early as Jensen and Meckling (1976) . In such models with within-…rm frictions, e.g., empire building, unveri…able investment, and asymmetric information, 4 the second best allocation 3 One particular mechanism wherein one …rm's borrowing imposes negative externalities on others is the …re-sale channel (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) and collateral constraint (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) . When industries or …rms experience temporary shocks in productivity, e¢ cient …rms will be forced to cut back investment or even go bankrupt when the collateral value drops. 4 For an extensive discussion for such models, see Harris and Raviv (1991) or Tirole (2006) . is achieved through capital structure choices that maximizes stakeholders'welfare. In other words, private contracting internalizes these frictions and achieves the constrained optimal allocation, so the social planner cannot increase welfare through intervention. Our innovation is to highlight a between-…rms externality so that the social planner can play a role.
Our modelling of capital structure is in the spirit of Leland (1994) . In that model, optimal leverage balances the dead-weight bankruptcy cost due to the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest with the bene…t of the debt tax subsidy. Our model asks why the tax policy of subsidizing debt exists in the …rst place. In our model, bankruptcy is still costly from the perspective of an individual …rm, but becomes socially bene…cial. The equity-debt con ‡ict of interest leads leveraged equity holders to exit sooner than they would otherwise, which alleviates the socially wasteful war of attrition.
However, only a positive tax subsidy can entice the …rm to borrow and impose the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest on themselves.
War of attrition models date back to Maynard Smith (1974) . 5 Our model, by allowing …rms to choose capital structure before entering the war of attrition, introduces endogenous types in a setting similar to Bulow and Klemperer (1999) . 6 We show that, in equilibrium, more productive …rms are e¤ectively stronger in the war of attrition than less productive ones, and use this monotonicity property to solve the model. We use this game to study the welfare consequences of subsidizing corporate debt …nancing. 7
Our paper is complementary to the current literature on welfare consequences of corporate taxation. While we focus on the welfare consequences of di¤erential tax treatment of debt and equity …nancing, this literature has mainly explored welfare consequences of taxation of other corporate choices. Gordon and Dietz (2006) and Chetty and Saez (2010) , for example, evaluate the welfare consequences of dividend tax changes. 8 Their focus is on taxing …rms'payouts to investors and the resulting distortions. Therefore they assume that the only outside …nancing in their model is equity. In our model payout policy does not play a role, since we allow equity holders to costlessly inject or remove cash from the …rm. The literature on dynamic optimal corporate taxation focuses on optimal capital taxation in general equilibrium models, in which …nancing does not play a role (e.g., Farhi, 2009). Instead, we hold corporate taxation …xed and explore the planner's problem of subsidizing debt …nancing.
Our paper is also related to literature on …nancial policy and industrial organization. Consistent 5 For wars-of-attrition with asymmetric information, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) , who model exit in a duopoly setting, and Kreps and Wilson (1982) . Recently, Hopenhyan and Squitnani (2011) consider the problem when the …rms'types stochastically change over time. For an application of strategic timing games to corporate …nance, see, for example, Acharya DeMarzo and Kremer (2011) . 6 Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 studies contests in which players have multidimensional types in a setting with complete information. 7 Since we introduce a social planner into the war of attrition, the paper is also broadly related to the work on optimal contest structure; see, for example, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) or Che and Gale (2003) . 8 See Auerbach (2002) for an extensive review of this literature.
with our view, Zingales (1998) shows empirically that …nancially weak …rms (i.e., …rms with high leverage) exit sooner following an industry-wide pro…tability shock. In a similar vein, Kovenock and Phillips (1997) show that in concentrated industries …rms undergoing large recapitalizations close more plants. Chevalier (1995) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) …nd evidence that supermarkets undergoing LBOs invest less in future customers by raising prices, which is consistent with the theoretical work in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) . 9 Our paper is also related to the literature on capital reallocations and its macro consequences, e.g., Shapiro (1998, 2001) , and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) .
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the baseline model. In Section 3, we establish the key monotonicity results, solve for the equilibrium debt schedule, and analyze welfare.
Section 4 considers extensions and provides discussions on implementation of debt tax shield in practice. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Firms and Market
We work in continuous time without discounting. Consider an industry with 2 …rms, indexed by 1 and 2. Each …rm is endowed with a single unit of capital, and has a privately observed productivity parameter i drawn from ; with 0, and a cumulative distribution function F ( ).
The density f ( ) = F 0 ( ) is continuous and strictly positive everywhere; we denote the hazard rate by h ( ) f ( ) = (1 F ( )). Firms'productivities i and j are independent and identically distributed. Without loss of generality, we index the more productive …rm as …rm 1 so that 1 > 2 .
Productivity i is each …rm's private information.
The cash ‡ows of a given …rm depend on whether its competitor is still present in the industry.
Following Bulow and Klemperer (1999) , at any point in time t, …rm i produces cash ‡ows of k if its opponent, …rm j, has not yet exited the industry, and realizes a lump sum pro…t of i when …rm j exits. 10 We can also interpret the positive constant k as a non-pecuniary externality that the presence of one …rm imposes on the other …rm. In the book industry example in the introduction, both …rms maintain their stores simply to steal business from the other …rm. Alternatively, one can consider this k as a wasteful component of investment to maintain market share, for example, through advertising. 9 On the other hand, Brander and Lewis (1986) shows that leverage, as a commitment device, may make the ongoing competition tougher. Our model di¤ers from this literature in that the …rm's leverage choice is unobservable to the competitors. 1 0 Consider a setting in which …rms obtain ‡ow payo¤s and the disocunt rate is r. The pro…tability index is i 2 ; . The …xed cost each period is 2k and there is no marginal cost of production. There is a market of size . With two …rms, the pro…t ‡ow of each …rm is 2 2k + r i while with one …rm it is 2k + r i. Set = 2k and r ! 0:Then, as two …rms compete, the pro…t ‡ow is k + r i ! k; and the present value from winning is R 1 0 e rt r idt = i:
At any time the …rm can be liquidated and the unit of capital is then redeployed to an alternative investment that yields a value of l 0. This liquidation can involve direct disinvestment of capital, but one can also interpret the liquidation as cessation of investment activities that the …rm needs in order to stay in business. Without loss of generality we normalize l to zero, which also corresponds to disinvestment. For simplicity we do not allow partial liquidation.
This industry is at overcapacity: the …rst best allocation results in an immediate exit of the less productive …rm. In our simple setting we only focus on …rm surplus, and do not model the consumer side of the industry. In such a model, once a …rm exits, the remaining …rm may increase prices and decrease consumer surplus, which should also be a part of the welfare calculation. Our analysis carries through even if there is a wedge between …rms'pro…ts and welfare, as long as the …rst best allocation is that only one …rm is active in the industry (see Section 3.2.3).
Financing
Each …rm's unit of capital is initially …nanced entirely by equity, owned by a single party at each …rm, the "equity holder."Before engaging in the war of attrition game described above, a …rm can raise debt …nancing, a stage that we call "the …nancing stage."
Debt is available from competitive banks who, unlike competitors, observe …rms' types. This is consistent with the idea that the bank will perform thorough due diligence once it establishes a …nancing relationship with the …rm. From the theoretical point of view, this assumption allows us to focus on the basic friction in the model, which is the …rm's private desire for excess continuation in the war of attrition. We relax this information assumption in Section 4.3 and show the key qualitative results still hold.
Debt is in the form of a callable bullet loan with face value b 0: the loan continuously rolls over and the bank can decide if it wants to collect b at any point in time. Equity has limited liability, and can decide to default and leave the …rm to the bank at any point in time. The bank cannot run the …rm in the current industry and redeploys the capital to alternative investment. 11;12 These assumptions imply that as long as both …rms are in the industry the bank will keep rolling the debt over, and the equity holder defaults whenever she decides to exit the industry.
The tax rate is 2 (0; 1). Our focus is the government's tax subsidy for debt …nancing relative to equity …nancing for a given level of overall corporate taxation-we do not want the subsidy to a¤ect the overall after-tax cash ‡ows of the …rm. We therefore …x after-tax cash ‡ows: the …ghting cost k , the winning cash ‡ow i , and the debt payment of the …rm b are all in after-tax dollars. 13 1 1 In other words, we invoke the standard assumption that bankruptcy reduces the actual productivity of the …rm: as the bank takes over, it does not, for example, have the human capital required to run the …rm e¢ ciently. 1 2 Cutting back investment rather than redeploying, is the key driver of our model. Therefore, our model applies even if the corporate form of …nancially distressed company survives under Chapter 11, as long as the bankruptcy procedure results in capacity cuts (see, for example Borenstein and Rose, 2003) . 1 3 Given the tax rate , the before-tax …ghting cost is k= (1 ), before-tax winning cash ‡ow is i= (1 ) and
By doing so, changing the tax rate only a¤ects the level of debt subsidies, but not the …rm's cash ‡ows. Thus given the after-tax debt payment b, the bank receives b= (1 ). E¤ectively, for every one dollar received by the bank, the government contributes dollars and the …rm pays 1 in after tax terms.
Equilibrium
We study symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. Firms …rst choose debt …nancing and then engage in a war of attrition exit game in which …rms have a two-dimensional type. The …rst dimension is the exogenously given productivity . The second dimension is the amount of debt b, which is endogenously determined.
Equilibrium debt schedule and equilibrium exit strategy
Consider …rm i with type i . The information that arrives as time passes is whether its opponent, …rm j; had exited up to this point. Throughout, we say that …rm i follows exit strategy t (exits at t), when it chooses to exit at t if …rm j has not exited at t , with t lim s"t s as the left limit of t. 14 Firm i's optimal exit time depends on its productivity i its debt burden b i . More importantly, as is standard in a war of attrition game, the …rm's exit time also depends on the exit strategy of …rm j, which we denote by T j . From the perspective of …rm i who does not observe opponent j's productivity nor its debt choice, the su¢ cient statistic for …rm j's strategy is the distribution of …rm j's exit time, which is denoted by G j (t) Pr (T j < t). We can write …rm i's optimal exit strategy as T i ; b i ; G j ( ) .
In any symmetric equilibrium, G j ( ) = G ( ). Let B ( ) : ! R + denote the equilibrium debt schedule, so that the …rm with productivity i borrows B ( i ) 0 in equilibrium. The distribution of (the opponent's) exit time depends on the e¤ective strength of all potential opponents, which in turn depends on the equilibrium debt schedule B ( ). From now on we write T ( i ; B ( i ) ; B ( )) as …rm i's equilibrium exit time strategy. Due to symmetry, T ( ; B ( ) ; B ( )) is also the equilibrium exit strategy of its opponent j with type , and we have in equilibrium
Two points are note-worthy regarding Eq. (1). First, in general T might be non-monotone in …rm's productivity : more productive …rms may exit sooner then some less productive …rms.
Formally, G (t) may be an integral of disconnected intervals and may involve jumps. Second, Eq. (1) embeds a …xed-point relation, as G (t) enters T ( ; ; ) on the right hand side through the equilibrium debt payment b 1 : 1 4 The left-limit de…nition implies that the …rm exiting decision only depends on the information set right before t. Intuitively, if both …rms set exiting strategy t, then both …rms will exit. This treatment plays a role when …rm j's strategy is such that, from …rm i's perspective, it places a positive probability mass of exiting at t. We show that in equilibrium this never occurs so this treatment is innocuous. debt schedule B ( )-the equilibrium exit times are a function of the debt schedule, which, in turn, is a function of equilibrium exit times.
Equity holder' s problem: war of attrition stage
We carry out our analysis backwards by …rst studying the war of attrition game. The payo¤ to equity from a …rm with productivity , which has chosen debt b, and exits at time t has a payo¤ of
Firm survives after opponent exits :
(2)
The …rst term captures the event where the …rm loses the war of attrition: with probability 1 G (t)
its opponent exits after t, and the equity holder loses k continuously until t. The second term captures the event where the …rm wins the war of attrition. If the opponent exits at time x, the equity holder's value is its payo¤ from winning, , minus the debt that is now due, b; and minus the realized cost of …ghting kx.
( b) kx:
The second term in (2) integrates over the opponent's exit time x 2 [0; t] according to the distribution G ( ). The equity holder chooses exit time to maximize the value of equity during the war of attrition:
Debt pricing in the …rst …nancing stage
As is standard (e.g., Leland, 1994) , …rms cannot commit to a particular exit strategy. The bank therefore infers a …rm's expected default time from its productivity and its choice of debt. Banks' ex post payo¤ depends on the before-tax promised debt payment b= (1 ), and the probability of repayment. If the …rm defaults it is liquidated for 0, so repayment occurs only when the other …rm exits. Therefore the probability of repayment is G (T ( ; b; B ( ))) 15 and the bank's expected payo¤, which is also the competitive debt price, is
There are two implicit assumptions underlying this debt value expression. First, each bank …nances only one …rm for whom it knows the productivity through due diligence; it does not observe the opponent's productivity nor their debt choice. We relax this information assumption in Section 4.3. Second, we have assumed that > b so that the debt is paid in full once the opponent exits.
In other words, …rms never borrow more than their own productivity, a property that always holds in equilibrium (Lemma 2).
Equity holders'problem in the …nancing stage
The equity holder chooses the debt of …rm to maximize her total wealth at the …nancing stage, which consists of the price obtained for issuing debt b (4) as well as her equity value (2). The equilibrium level of debt, B ( ) then solves the following problem:
Because a …rm cannot commit to an exit strategy the debt choice b in ‡uences the …rm's ex-post exit strategy T ( ; b; B ( )), which feeds back into the competitive debt price paid by banks.
De…nition of equilibrium
The equilibrium in this model consists of the debt schedule B ( ) and the exit time strategy T ( ; ; B ( )) so that competitive banks earn zero pro…ts, i.e., (4) holds; and the equity holder in each …rm maximizes her value in each stage, i.e., (3) and (5) hold. Note that for each …rm, the conjectured opponent's exit time distribution has to be consistent with the equilibrium debt schedule and the equilibrium exit strategy, i.e., (1) has to hold.
Equilibrium with Subsidized Debt
In this section we …rst show that in equilibrium more productive …rms are always stronger in the war of attrition, even accounting for their choice of debt. This critical property allows us to solve for the equilibrium exit times, the equilibrium debt schedule and welfare implications of the model.
Equilibrium Debt Schedule and Exit Times
Monotone e¤ective strength
We de…ne a …rm's "e¤ective strength" as the payo¤ from winning the war of attrition net of debt payments, b. From (2) we see that it is e¤ective strength that determines the payo¤ from the war of attrition and therefore drives di¤erences in …rms'exit times. The next lemma shows that the …rm with greater e¤ective strength exits later.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium exit time T ( ; b; B ( )) is a function of e¤ ective strength b only, so we denote T ( ; b) by T ( b). T ( ) is increasing, and strictly increasing when G (T ( )) 2 (0; 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
To see the intuition, which is similar to Bulow and Klemperer (1999) , assume that G (t) is di¤erentiable with density G 0 (t) = g (t); 16 then, from (2), the marginal bene…t to equity from staying longer is g (t) ( b). Because the marginal bene…t is strictly increasing in b, …rms with a higher e¤ective strength b have an incentive to exit later. Of course, once a …rm is certain to win the war, G (T ( b)) = 1, then increasing e¤ective strength does not a¤ect its exit time and vice versa for G (T ( b)) = 0.
From now on, for simplicity, we denote T ( ; b) by T ( b). The next lemma is the central result in this section:
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, a …rm's e¤ ective strength in the war of attrition B ( ) is strictly increasing in .
Proof. See Appendix A.
To see the intuition, let us …rst express the …rm value from (5) using Lemma 1 such that only the e¤ective strength b enters equity value and exit time:
Consider two …rms 1 > 2 that have the same e¤ective strength in equilibrium,
( 2 ) and compare their incentives to marginally increase debt. First, the marginal impact of increasing b on equity value E in (6) is the same for both …rms because of equal e¤ective strength.
The marginal impact of increasing b on debt value is
The …rst term is again the same for both types. Consider the second term: the …rms have the same e¤ective strength, and 1 > 2 so the more productive …rm borrows more, B ( 1 ) > B ( 2 ) ; further, increasing debt leads to earlier exit, lowering the probability of winning, so G b (T ( b; B ( ))) < 0.
The second term therefore shows that the less productive …rm has strictly higher incentives for increasing debt, since a small decrease in the probability of winning causes a smaller drop in the price of its debt. At the equilibrium choice of e¤ective strength for the more productive …rm, the less productive …rm wants to increase its debt burden and lower is e¤ective strength.
Equilibrium exit times
Lemma 2 shows that, in equilibrium, from a given …rm's point of view its opponents type becomes e¤ectively one dimensional. This greatly simpli…es the analysis: we can work directly with the underlying distribution of productivity , rather than integrating over two dimensions of opponent's type ( and b). Given any potential equilibrium debt schedule B ( ), we can characterize exit times along the lines of Bulow and Klemperer (1999) , with modi…cations to account potential discontinuities in B ( ). 17
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know that the equilibrium exit time is strictly increasing in …rm's productivity. We can therefore de…ne the equilibrium exit time b T ( ; B ( )) only as a function of underlying productivity, which is characterized by the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium exit time T ( ; B ( ) ; B ( )) is strictly increasing in . Given an
Weaker …rms always exit earlier than stronger …rms, i.e., b T ( ; B ( )) is strictly increasing in .
And, in equilibrium the cumulative distribution function for exit time
The see the intuition behind (7) consider the decision of type to …ght a bit longer (d b T ( )).
The cost of …ghting is kd b T ( ). The bene…t is that the opponent may exit over that interval, and the …rm reaps the bene…t of B ( ). The exit times are strictly monotonic in productivity, and the equilibrium is symmetric. Then the conditional probability of an opponent's exit, if she has not exited up to this point, is the hazard rate h ( ) d from the productivity distribution. To equate marginal cost with marginal bene…t so that kd b T ( ) = ( B ( )) h ( ) d , the optimal exit time satis…es:
To obtain the exit time b T ( ), we integrate the marginal times for …rms that exit before type , and the integration starts from who sets b T ( ) = 0.
Proposition 1 shows the e¤ect of the equilibrium debt schedule B ( ) on exit times. As we can see in (8), higher debt reduces the payo¤ from winning the war, thereby inducing faster exit for each individual …rm. This direction of distortion is essentially the same as the debt overhang e¤ect in Leland (1994) . 18 More interestingly, increasing debt for a given type decreases exit times for all higher types, because exit times are cumulative.
Equilibrium debt schedule
We now solve for the equilibrium debt schedule, which is one of the central results of the paper.
For exposition purposes we heuristically derive the …rm's …rst order condition (FOC) for choosing debt. A rigorous treatment is provided in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.
First, we study the direct e¤ect of marginally increasing b by …xing the exit time at the equilibrium level T ( B ( )). Issuing more debt leads to an increase in debt and a decrease in equity value. Without a tax subsidy these two forces exactly cancel out, because, for a given exit time, b only a¤ects the allocation of …rm value between equity and debt in the spirit of Modigliani and Miller (1958) . With a tax subsidy the direct e¤ect is positive as a higher debt burden increases the subsidy. This is the marginal bene…t of debt, M B. Since the total tax subsidy is b 1
This direct positive e¤ect is the main force through which the subsidy increases equilibrium debt levels.
Second, we study the indirect e¤ect of increasing debt due to the endogenous change of exit
Because exit time is chosen to maximize equity value, the envelope theorem suggests zero …rst-order change in equity value in (2) from a marginal change in exit time. However, a lower exit time T has a negative …rst-order impact on debt value D = b 1 G (T ( b)), because the probability of winning the war declines. This is the marginal cost of increasing debt:
Relative to the marginal bene…t in (9), the marginal cost in (10) is more complicated: the decrease in exit time potentially depends on the distribution of the opponent's equilibrium exit time b T ( ; B ( )), which in turn depends on the underlying productivity distribution and the equilibrium debt schedule B ( ).
To calculate the marginal cost in (10) we use the insight from Proposition 1 that the probability of winning the war of attrition only depends on where a …rm ranks in the distribution of e¤ective strength. This allows us to compute (10) without relying on the equilibrium exit time b T ( ; B ( )).
We calculate how a small increase in debt changes the ranking of …rm . Increasing b marginally from B ( ) by > 0 lowers the …rm's e¤ective strength from B ( ) to B ( ) . We can …nd a type ( ) whose equilibrium e¤ective strength is exactly B ( ) , 19 so that
1 9 From continutiy of B ( ) (see proof of Lemma 1) we know that such a type exists.
Therefore increasing debt by changes the relative ranking by 1 B 0 ( ) . This is intuitive: if the slope of equilibrium schedule B 0 ( ) is close to one, then, in equilibrium, …rms'e¤ective strength B ( ) increases slowly in . Increasing debt above the equilibrium level even by a small amount will cause a large decline in ranking of e¤ective strength in the war of attrition.
To further translate the decrease in ranking into the marginal reduction of winning probability, we need to multiply this impact by the density of opponents f ( ). As a result, the marginal cost in (10) can be alternatively expressed in a more intuitive way:
Equating the marginal bene…t in (9) with the marginal cost in (11), the equilibrium debt schedule must satisfy:
The closed-form solution to this di¤erential equation (12) characterizes the equilibrium debt schedule based on the primitives of the model in the next theorem. We further establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium debt schedule, and show that there are no pro…table global deviations from the debt schedule characterized by the …rst order condition in (12).
Theorem 1 There exists a unique symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The equilibrium debt schedule is
with B (0) = 0 and B ( ) < for > 0. In the war of attrition stage, the equilibrium exit times are given by (7) in Proposition 1, with B ( ) given in (13).
We present a sketch of the proof, which demonstrates that …rms do not want to deviate globally from the equilibrium debt levels, (13), so that the FOC given in (12) is a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium existence. We want to show that whenever the debt level exceeds the equilibrium given in (12), b ( ) > B ( ), the …rm can pro…tably increase its value V ( ; b) (see (6)), by reducing
). 20 Lemma 2 shows that e¤ ective strength is increasing in underlying productivity, which implies that 0 < and consequently, b ( ) > B 0 . We compare the marginal impact of increasing debt, b; on …rm value for these two …rms. Since 
Welfare Implications
In general, a debt tax subsidy could a¤ect welfare in our model through two distinct channels. The …rst is through sorting conditional on …rm exit, i.e. if a …rm exits, is it the relatively less productive …rm that leaves the industry? Second, even if weaker …rms exit …rst, so that sorting is e¢ cient, how long is the socially wasteful war of attrition? In this section we analyze how the debt subsidy a¤ects these two dimensions of welfare.
E¢ cient sorting property with endogenous …nancial strength
We …rst discuss whether sorting conditional on exit is e¢ cient. In other words, whether it is the relatively low productivity …rms that exit …rst. In a standard asymmetric information war of attrition without debt …nancing, sorting is e¢ cient (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Bulow and Klemperer, 1999) .
That sorting should be e¢ cient is not obvious in our model. When …rms enter the war of attrition game, their strength has two dimensions: their exogenous productivity and their endogenous debt B ( ). A priori, once debt is subsidized, the equilibrium e¤ective strength in the war of attrition need not be monotone in the underlying productivity. If more productive …rms borrow too much, it is possible that they are e¤ectively weaker than less productive …rms. In fact, a casual argument would suggest that more productive …rms should take on more debt: Because they can borrow to achieve the same e¤ective strength, they are able to enjoy greater tax subsidies. Under this logic, it may be possible to violate e¢ cient sorting. 21 However, Proposition 1 guarantees sorting e¢ ciency in our model: More productive …rms never "over borrow" relative to less productive …rms, and therefore in equilibrium less productive …rms always exit earlier. As a result, conditional on …rm exit, it is the less productive …rm that exits in equilibrium
Debt tax subsidy and exit times
The previous section implies that welfare only depends on how soon the relatively less productive …rm exits the industry. This section studies the e¤ect of the debt tax subsidy on …rms'exit times.
The following proposition serves as a benchmark. Without a tax subsidy ( = 0) …rms will not take on debt in equilibrium, and less productive …rms exit too late relative to the …rst best.
Proposition 2 Without a tax subsidy = 0, the unique equilibrium is all-equity …nancing, B ( ) = 0 for all . As a result, the equilibrium exit times are
With a positive debt tax subsidy, in equilibrium …rms take on debt consistent with Theorem 1, which shortens exit times:
Corollary 1 The debt schedule B ( ; ) is strictly increasing and exit times b T ( ; B ( ; )) are strictly decreasing in the tax subsidy for all > .
When the debt tax subsidy increases, every …rm has an incentive to take on a bit more debt.
This direct e¤ect is reinforced in equilibrium: Theorem 1 shows that any increase in debt by a given …rm also has an indirect e¤ect on increasing the debt level of all …rms with higher productivity;
we will come back to this upward spillover e¤ect in Section 3.2.3. As debt reduces …rms'e¤ective strength, the tax subsidy shortens exit times.
Subsidizing the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest of weaker …rms The heart of the above argument is that debt induces the well-known con ‡ict of interest between equity-and debt-holders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leland, 1994) . A debt …nanced …rm defaults earlier than it would otherwise, because equity does not internalize the losses to the bank in the war of attrition stage.
Because debt is priced competitively, the equity holder at the …nancing stage internalizes any cost that it imposes on debt during the war of attrition stage. If there is no tax subsidy, debt …nancing reduces equity holders'value in the …nancing stage by distorting exit times in the war of attrition.
Without a subsidy, the equity holder minimizes the con ‡ict of interest by not borrowing.
A debt tax subsidy encourages …rms to take on debt, and therefore intensi…es this con ‡ict of interest between debt and equity. The proponents of abolishing the subsidy argue that this con ‡ict is costly for …rms, and therefore subsidizing it is welfare destroying. In our setting, on the other hand, this con ‡ict of interest shortens a wasteful war of attrition. Firms do not internalize this bene…t, which accrues to the opponent who wins the war. Thus, a debt subsidy is required to encourage the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest, which improves welfare in overcapacity industries.
Therefore, in contrast to most of the previous literature, we emphasize that the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest can be socially desirable and needs to be subsidized.
Optimallity of positive debt tax subsidy
Now we study the e¤ect of the debt tax subsidy on welfare. We start by computing the surplus to a …rm with productivity . We …rst compute the expected …ghting costs, which have two components.
First, if the opponents are weaker, y < , the …rm incurs a total …ghting cost of k b T (y; B ( )) as the opponent y exits at b T (y; B ( )). This gives an expected cost of
where the second equality uses (7) and integration by parts. Second, with probability 1 F ( ) the opponent is stronger, and the …rm 's …ghting cost of k b T ( ; B) is a deadweight loss. Adding this cost to (15) the total expected …ghting cost is simply
On the other hand, …rm generates a positive payo¤ only if its opponent y is weaker, which is R f (y) dy. Summing up the costs and bene…t, the surplus of …rm is
where B (y) is given in (13) The higher the debt schedule, the lower the e¤ective strength of weaker opponents, the higher the welfare.
The total expected social surplus S is an integration of individual …rm surplus s ( ; ) over all types:
The following proposition formally shows that subsidizing debt increases welfare. This result is straightforward at this point: Eq. (16) shows that higher debt levels lead to higher welfare. Increasing the subsidy raises the equilibrium debt schedule (Corollary 1), therefore increasing welfare.
Proposition 3 The expected social surplus S ( ) is strictly increasing in debt subsidy , i.e., S 0 ( ) > 0.
The impact of the debt subsidy on total surplus S ( ) is at work through two distinct upward spillover forces: the …rst operates through equilibrium exit times, and the second through the equilibrium debt schedule. Consider the following thought experiment in which only …rm obtains a higher debt subsidy , which induces it to borrow a bit more. First, holding the rest of the debt schedule …xed, welfare increases for all …rms that are more productive than -notice that a weaker …rms'borrowing enters in the welfare of more productive …rms in (16). This is due to the bottom-up cumulative feature of equilibrium exit times in (7). The second upward spillover e¤ect is on the equilibrium debt schedule, because a higher debt by increases the borrowing of all types above from Theorem 1. The total welfare e¤ect of a higher subsidy will be the full interaction and ampli…cation of these two forces. Finally, keep in mind that our thought experiment only changed the subsidy for …rm . When we consider the impact of the subsidy on welfare in Proposition 3, S 0 ( ) ; it is all …rms that experience the increase.
While we do not model the product market, it is useful to discuss whether our welfare results are robust to a modi…cation in which consumer surplus decreases when a …rm exits the industry, either because of increased market power of the remaining …rm, or smaller availability of di¤erentiated products. Our analysis carries through even if there is a wedge between …rms'pro…ts and welfare, as long as the …rst best allocation is that only one …rm is active in the industry. 22
In some way, the result that welfare is increasing in the debt subsidy is not surprising. Our model is designed to highlight the social bene…ts of debt only; we have intentionally ignored the associated social costs, which have been better understood in the literature heretofore. In an extension in Section 4.2 we show that this result critically hinges on the fact that the industry has experienced a permanent shock to either demand or technology and never recovers. If, on the other hand, distress is temporary, and the industry might recover, then debt might also generate welfare costs in our model.
A Special Class of Distribution
The equilibrium debt schedule takes a simple linear form for a class of productivity distribution functions. Consider = 0; and F ( ) = , where > 0 and = . 23 This family of distribution functions nests the uniform distribution at = 1. Using (13), …rms take a debt that 2 2 Suppose that total welfare, including consumer surplus, during the war of attrition is 2 ; > 0, and welfare after the war of attrition is some function of the productivity of the surviving …rm w ( ) 0 with w being an arbitrary increasing function of , i.e. welfare is increasing with the productivity of the surviving …rm. The …rst best allocation in this setting is for one …rm to survive. Instead of the total surplus computed in 17, the surplus is S = E R f (y) w ( ) k (y B (y)) dy and it is straightforward to see that welfare is increasing in the debt subsidy .
2 3 More generally, the simple linear form holds for nonzero lower bound type , i.e., F ( ) = ( ) where > 0 and = .
is a constant fraction of their productivity.
B ( ) = + :
Consequently each …rm's e¤ective strength B ( ) = + is also a fraction of its productivity.
The surplus generated by …rm is
and the incremental welfare from subsidizing debt is
which is increasing in . Later we use this special class of distributions in the extension with temporary distress in Section 4.2.
Extensions and Discussion
Debt Tax Subsidy: Implementation
We discuss how our model captures some of the richness in the IRS tax treatment of securities for tax purposes. Firms can potentially issue a wide range of securities that they could in principle claim to be debt instruments, which therefore deserve tax preferential treatment. In 1994, the IRS set forth factors that they use in determining whether a particular security is considered taxexempt. 24 From these factors we infer which security features the IRS is trying to subsidize and link these to the forces in our model.
The …rst factor is that "there is an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain on demand or at a …xed maturity date that is in the reasonable foreseeable future."The unconditional promise means that payments cannot be state contingent. The non-state contingent nature of debt is critical in our model because it generates the correct type of con ‡ict of interest. Suppose the …rm could issue a tax-advantaged security whose payo¤ would be contingent on the …rm's pro…tability; for instance, the equity security pays out (or bears) a fraction of the …rm's pro…t (loss). Proposition 1 shows that the incentive to …ght is determined by the ratio of the payo¤ conditional on winning the war relative to the cost of …ghting. Such a state contingent tax subsidized security would allow the …rm to reap the tax bene…t without in ‡uencing the war of attrition at all. 25
That tax-exempt debt securities must create a con ‡ict of interest between debt and equity holders is de…nitely not just a coincidence. In fact, the following factors explicitly require a con ‡ict for debt to be subsidized.
1. First, the IRS considers "whether there is identity between the holders of the instrument and stockholders of the issuer," i.e., debt should be held by a di¤erent entity than equity. If the same investor held both debt and equity in our model, she would simply maximize the (private) value of the …rm, reverting back to the all equity case. 26 2. Second, the IRS considers whether "the rights of the instruments are subordinate to the rights of general creditors," i.e., whether instrument holders are lower in priority of liquidation than general debt holders. Suppose the tax subsidized instrument had the same priority in bankruptcy as equity. Then equity would pari pasu participate in the liquidation of the company, ex-post bearing a part of bankruptcy cost, which would partially resolve the con ‡ict of interest between debt and equity. Consequently, it dampens the incentive of equity holders to liquidate the …rm, lengthening the war of attrition.
3. Finally, the IRS requires that the holders of debt should not have the right to participate in the management of the …rm, giving equity the decision rights. If debt holders were allowed to participate in the liquidation decision in our model, they would delay liquidation, since they bear the cost ex-post. This would allow equity to reap the bene…ts of the tax subsidy ex ante through debt pricing without shortening the war of attrition.
That the IRS subsidizes securities that create a con ‡ict of interest between equity and debt holders, especially in regards to bankruptcy, is intriguing. Although the literature, starting from Jensen and Meckling (1976) , has been emphasizing the dark side of the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest, IRS explicitly favors this type of con ‡ict. This seemingly odd requirement is consistent with our model. The equity-debt con ‡ict of interest, which is at the heart of our argument, in is socially desirable, as we discuss in Section 3.2.2.
While the goal of our paper is primarily normative, these results on practical implementation of the subsidy necessarily raise the hurdle for alternative explanations of the debt tax subsidy. For example, consider an alternative explanation in which the debt tax subsidies are a result of lobbying by lenders and borrowers, who want to extract rents from the government. Then one would want to explain why rents to the intermediation sector and borrowers are maximized by this particular implementation of the subsidy.
A more sophisticated alternative explanation would be that equity holders dislike discipline from debt holders, even though it improves …rm value. The government realizes that this limits borrowing by equity holders, and therefore debt needs to be subsidized. First, notice that this may not in fact be an externality. Since equity holders internalize their misbehavior ex ante when rasing debt, the role for the government is not a priori clear. Moreover, this view is inconsistent with point 3 above, in which the IRS requires that debt holders not have the right to participate in the management of the …rm. If debt is subsidized to ensure monitoring of equity holders, allowing debt holders to intervene would be a good solution.
Another alternative explanation would be that debt tax subsidies exist for historical reasons.
In response the IRS uses the con ‡ict of interest to curb equity holders' borrowing and limit the amount of debt tax subsidies to the business sector. In addition to being a socially costly way to decrease rents, this view is inconsistent with point 3: allowing debt holders to intervene should be more e¤ective in limiting equity holders'borrowing.
Duration of distress
In the model above we analyze an industry that has been hit with a permanent demand or technology shock, from which it can only recover by reducing capacity. In this case, subsidizing debt is always optimal and higher subsidies lead to more welfare through faster exits. Suppose instead, that the demand shock is temporary, and the industry will eventually recover to support the full capacity. In this section we study how changing the duration of industry shocks alters the role of subsidizing corporate debt …nancing.
We study an industry that will eventually recover at time T d , at which point the war of attrition exogenously terminates. If both …rms persist until T d , they each obtain their corresponding payo¤ i 's. The model studied above is nested as T d goes to in…nity.
First best
The fact that the industry recovers to support both …rms at T d implies that it may not always be socially desirable to eliminate the weaker …rm. Consider the …rst best allocation, and index the stronger …rm with 1 . If both …rms survive until T d the total surplus is 1 + 2 2kT d . Alternatively, the weaker …rm exits immediately and the surplus is 1 . Therefore, the …rst-best allocation is Both …rms survive if 2 2kT d Only strong …rm 1 survives if 2 < 2kT d :
In other words, the weaker …rm should exit immediately if its productivity is below the total …ghting cost in the industry until recovery, 2kT d . The productivity threshold, at which the weaker …rm should exit under …rst best, is increasing in the duration of distress. In our benchmark case distress is permanent (T d = 1), and thus it is always socially e¢ cient for the weak …rm to exit immediately.
Equilibrium characterization
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the model in which distress is temporary.
There is an endogenous threshold type^ who is indi¤erent between exiting before T d and waiting until T d . Firms below^ have equilibrium debt schedules and an exit times that are identical to the benchmark case with T d = 1. Firms above^ never exit, and they borrow to the extent that their e¤ective strengths equals that of the threshold type^ .
Proposition 4 In the model with a distress period T d , the equilibrium debt schedule is
and the equilibrium exit times are:
where the unique threshold type^ is given by the solution to the equation
And, the threshold^ is decreasing in and increasing in T d .
If a solution to 18 does not exist, B ( ) and b T ( ) are given by the benchmark model.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To see the intuition, the equity holder's payo¤ given the opponent's exit time distribution G (t)
is
In short, if a …rm exits before T d , her payo¤ is exactly the same as in the benchmark case T d = 1.
If the …rm decides to stay until T d , however, she wins the prize for sure. We can follow the same argument as before to show that in the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium the exit time b T ( ) is strictly increasing in (before T d ). Thus, there will be a threshold^ such that …rms above^ never exit. For types below^ , the game is the same as in the benchmark model. Because the equilibrium exit of …rm only depends on the marginal exit time of his weaker opponents, the equilibrium exit time for all types below^ is the same as in the benchmark model.
The equilibrium debt schedule B ( ) for <^ is also identical to the benchmark model. Any type will borrow so that the marginal bene…t of debt tax shield equalizes the marginal cost of weakening herself, so the same …rst order condition as (12) determines the debt schedule. Firms >^ borrow the highest amount of debt such that they never exit, which equalizes their e¤ective strength with that of^ . Finally, the equation for the threshold^ , Eq. (18), is determined from the indi¤erence condition between exiting at b T ^ ; B and staying forever for type^ . 27 Proposition 4 shows that the debt subsidy in industries with temporary distress a¤ects …rm exit on two margins. First, increasing debt reduces exit times of …rms which would have exited even if there were no subsidy. This is the intensive margin of exit, which is also present in the benchmark case in which industry distress is permanent. When industry distress is temporary, in addition to the intensive margin, subsidizing debt also a¤ects the extensive margin of exit. As the debt tax subsidy increases debt levels, the threshold productivity^ decreases. This induces …rms, which would not have exited otherwise, into bankruptcy.
Duration of distress, welfare, and an interior optimal debt subsidy
We now explore how changing the duration of industry shocks a¤ects the result from Proposition 3, that increasing debt subsidies always increases welfare. We compare the allocation in Proposition 4 with the …rst best allocation. The planner faces a tradeo¤: increasing the subsidy past the point at which^ = 2kT d has both bene…ts and costs. Increasing the subsidy improves the intensive margin of exit by accelerating weaker …rms' default. But it also forces the exit of …rms that should not exit under the …rst best allocation:^ = 2kT d .
We …rst argue that the welfare optimal debt subsidy is strictly positive even with eventual recovery. Without a debt subsidy …rms still refrain from debt …nancing. The argument is similar to the benchmark case in Section 3.2.2. With only equity …nancing 18, the threshold type^ = kT d k b T ^ ; B = 0 < 2kT d . Thus the planner can increase welfare on both the intensive and extensive margin by increasing the debt subsidy from 0.
In contrast to the benchmark case, the debt tax subsidy can be too large. This occurs when the marginal bene…t of increasing the intensive margin of exit is outweighed by bankrupting …rms that should not have exited. Balancing these two forces then gives rise to an interior welfare maximizing debt subsidy . We illustrate this point using the productivity distribution F ( ) = introduced in Section 3.3. In Appendix B, we provide a closed-form expression for (18) which allows us to solve for the threshold type^ ( ) as a function of . Consider the numerical example in Figure 1 , where k = 0:1, T d = 1, = 0:2, = 3:5 so that = 0:78. The left panel graphs the threshold type^ ( ) against the debt subsidy . As increases, …rms take on more debt, and the threshold type^ ( ) increases, which implies that both the expected number and productivity of …rms going bankrupt increases. At = 0:28 the threshold type^ ( ) exceeds the …rst-best cuto¤ 2kT d = 0:2.
At this point the expected number and productivity of …rms going bankrupt is at the …rst best.
The optimal debt subsidy , however, exceeds 0:28, because weaker …rms'exit times are above the …rst best levels. As is shown in the right panel, the social planner is willing to trade-o¤ ine¢ cient bankruptcy with shorter exit times and we obtain the highest welfare at = 0:36. 
Productivity unobservable to banks
In order to highlight the role that the war of attrition plays in our model, the benchmark model assumes that asymmetry of information about productivity is limited only to …rms. In other words, a bank can observe the productivity of the …rm that it is …nancing. In this section we show that our main results are robust to relaxing this assumption. In particular, we show that less productive …rms exit …rst, that exit times given a debt schedule do not change, and that it is welfare maximizing to subsidize debt.
As in the benchmark model, the debt market is competitive. Firms request debt b from banks, who do not observe …rms'types. In this setting, the war of attrition given a debt schedule remains the same, i.e., the equity holder's objective in (2) is unchanged. There is a substantive di¤erence in debt pricing since banks use debt choices to infer …rms'productivity. Firms then try to use debt choices to manipulate this inference. Given a particular equilibrium, de…ne the set of types that choose debt b as (b) f : B ( ) = bg. Then, conditional on b, the exit time distribution can be summarized by
:
Debt value for a given type is D (b; ) = G (T ( ; b; B ( ))) b 1 as in (4). Integrating over types conditional on b, the competitive price for debt b is
Firm chooses debt B ( ) to maximize its value at the …nancing stage:
The equilibrium in this extension of the model consists of the debt schedule B ( ) and the exit time strategy T ( ; ; B ( )) such that competitive banks earn zero pro…ts, i.e., (19) holds; and the equity holder maximizes her value at each stage, i.e., (3) and (20) hold.
We only present the main results from the model. We can solve the benchmark model because Lemma 2 shows that e¤ective strength is increasing in productivity. While this relationship is preserved in this extension, the mechanism is di¤erent.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium debt schedule B ( ) is non-increasing, and in any equilibrium more productive types choose (weakly) lower debt. Therefore, a …rm's e¤ ective strength in the war of attrition B ( ) is strictly increasing in productivity .
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition for this lemma comes from truthful revelation of …rms' productivity: more productive …rms, which …ght longer, in expectation pay more to the banks for the same choice of b. As servicing debt is more costly for more productive …rms, they in equilibrium take (weakly) less debt. This result is stronger than the one in Lemma 2. With complete information, more productive …rms try to take advantage of the debt subsidy by borrowing more, but not enough to make themselves weaker then less productive …rms in the war of attrition. With asymmetric information, more productive …rms take on (weakly) less debt. In other words, …rms with greater productivity e¤ectively become even (weakly) stronger in the war of attrition. This monotonicity result implies that, just as when banks observe …rm productivity, subsidized debt …nancing does not cause ine¢ ciencies in ex-post sorting of …rms-weak …rms always exit …rst.
Further, Lemma 3 also implies that for a given debt schedule the equilibrium exit times are closely related to Proposition 1. The di¤erence is that the debt schedule may a¤ect the extensive margin of exit even if the industry never recovers. Because the debt schedule is decreasing in productivity, there could be types which obtain more debt than their productivity < B ( ). These types exit immediately as they lose money even if the other …rm exits …rst. In the benchmark model this cannot occur, since a bank is not willing to lend to a …rm which defaults instantaneously. In the asymmetric information case, on the other hand, low productivity …rms may be able to extract an information rent in the …nancing stage and then immediately default.
Lemma 4 Let^ inf f : B ( ) > 0g. Then
The next proposition is the central result in this section, which shows that setting a positive tax subsidy remains optimal.
1. Without the tax subsidy, = 0, the unique equilibrium is all-equity …nancing, i.e. B ( ) = 0 for all .
2. The equilibrium exit times with = 0 are
3. The social planner chooses a positive tax subsidy, > 0.
The …rst and second results replicate Proposition 2. Without debt subsidies, …rms internalize the equity-debt con ‡ict of interest but not the war of attrition externality. Therefore they will not take on any debt in equilibrium.
In contrast to the benchmark case, debt …nancing has a social cost. Inducing more debt leads to ine¢ cient liquidation if the productivity of both …rms is below^ . Then both …rms are liquidated immediately, although the stronger one should have survived under …rst best. Nevertheless, Proposition 5 shows that for small levels of debt, this cost is always dominated by the bene…t of expediting faster exits of weaker …rms. Thus, a debt tax subsidy is necessary to induce a welfare maximizing level of debt.
To see the intuition, consider increasing the debt tax subsidy to induce a small increase in the debt schedule, B ( ) > 0. Because B ( ) is small,^ either equals or is close to because B ( ) is weakly decreasing in . Due to the cumulative feature of exit times, the welfare gain from shortening exit times bene…ts almost all …rms, >^ . The welfare loss, on the other hand, is very unlikely, since both …rms have to lie in the interval of h ;^ i , which is at a lower order compared to the social bene…t.
The results in this section are robust to a wide class of models in which there is asymmetric information between banks and …rms. For example, consider the model in which the bank is a monopolist and o¤ers a debt schedule to …rms. Lemma 3 (which relies only on truth-telling incentives of the …rms), Lemma 4, and the …rst two results without debt subsidy in Proposition 5, are una¤ected. The only part of the argument that explicitly relies on the shape of the debt schedule is the proof for the third result in Proposition 5. However, for strictly positive but arbitrarily small debt schedules, the proof proceeds along similar lines of comparing second order losses on the extensive margin and …rst order gains on the intensive margin.
Coasian Solution
In this subsection we examine a "Coasian" solution to the costly war of attrition. Speci…cally, we examine whether a third …rm (called C) can purchase both …rms in the industry, potentially close the less productive …rm, and thereby internalize the cost. In that case the government does not need to use tax policy to reduce the war of attrition externality. Because …rms' productivity is private information, the buyer faces an adverse selection problem. We show that adverse selection is so severe that it imposes losses on the buyer whenever she tries to internalize this externality. In other words, the Coasian solution fails so there is room for government intervention.
We …rst consider static unconditional bidding, and then extend this case to conditional o¤ers and the ability of …rm C to make o¤ers over time. We …nish this section with a short discussion of mergers and acquisitions.
Static bidding
We …rst examine the case where …rm C can only make o¤ers once. Formally, before the war of attrition, …rm C o¤ers a price p to both …rms. Both …rms decide simultaneously whether to accept the bid, which is public information. If a …rm is indi¤erent then it accepts the bid. 28 Upon purchase, C learns the productivity of acquired …rms and can decide whether and which …rms to close. If only one …rm accepts the bid, then C inherits that …rm's asset and competes with the other …rm in the war of attrition.
Our main result is given in Proposition 6. We …rst establish that the equilibrium strategy of rejecting bids is monotone in …rms'type. In equilibrium there exists a threshold^ , such that …rms, which are more productive than^ reject the bid and vice versa. Second, we characterize the unique pure strategy equilibrium of this game. To do so, we have to specify o¤ equilibrium beliefs. Suppose i >^ > j: In equilibrium the strong …rm i >^ rejects the bid and the weak …rm j <^ sells its asset to …rm C. Therefore, in equilibrium it has been revealed that C owns the weaker …rm, so it will exit immediately. However, on the o¤ equilibrium path …rm C may enter the war of attrition.
We impose the o¤ equilibrium belief that the strong …rm i , which rejected the bid, forgets that C's asset is weak, and instead behaves as though the sold …rm is drawn from the distribution of …rms which should have rejected the bid.
Note that this o¤ equilibrium belief increases incentives of i to sell the …rm, improving the potential for a pro…table acquisition by …rm C, and thus favors the Coasian solution. However, even under favorable o¤ equilibrium beliefs, and the fact that C faces no competition in bidding for …rms, we show that it earns strictly negative pro…ts in situations in which any externalities are internalized, so the private solution always fails.
Proposition 6
We have the following results: 1. Given p, the equilibrium strategy of rejecting bids is monotonically increasing in …rm type.
2. Under the o¤ equilibrium belief speci…ed above, given p there exists a unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, de…ne the cuto¤ b which solves b F b = p. All …rms below^ accept the bid and all …rms above^ reject the bid. If both …rms accept, …rm C closes the weaker …rm. If both …rms reject the bid, they compete in a war of attrition with exit times Proposition 2 truncated below at^ . If …rm i rejects, while …rm j accepts so the …rm C buys …rm j, …rm C exits immediately (and …rm i stays forever).
3. In any equilibrium in (2) in which …rms are sold with positive probabilities, the buyer's expected pro…ts are strictly negative.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The results in Proposition 6 are intuitive. As …rm C raises its bid, it draws in marginally more productive …rms, which increases the expected value of acquired …rms and the probability that it internalizes the externality. Result 3 shows that this bene…t is more than undone, since a price increase also accrues to less productive …rms who would have accepted a lower bid as well.
Therefore it is optimal for …rm C not to bid, and the private solution to internalize the externality between the …rms breaks down.
We also consider contingent bids in which C pays price p only when both …rms accept. One may think such o¤ers should reduce the adverse selection problem and therefore increase the viability of a private solution to externalities. The corollary below states that that is not the case. The argument is similar to the one with non-contingent o¤ers.
Corollary 2 In any equilibrium of a contingent o¤ er game in which …rms are sold with positive probabilities, the buyer's expected pro…ts are strictly negative.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Time-varying bidding schedule
The previous section considers only static o¤ers. Now suppose that …rm C can o¤er a history dependent pricing schedule and both …rms can choose to sell at any time. More speci…cally, …rm C can o¤er a schedule fp 1 ( ) ; p 2 ( ; )g. Each …rm can be the …rst to sell its asset to C at a price of p 1 (t) 0 at time t or it can reject the bid; the sale is publicly observable. If there is only one …rm (say i) that sells, then …rm j competes with …rm C (with asset i ) after t. Firm C can close the …rm at any time and may propose a continuation pricing o¤er p 2 (s; t) 0 for any future time s > t. If both …rms sell to C at the same time, then C may close either of the acquired …rms at any point in time as in the static case.
As before, if a …rm is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the bid, it accepts the bid.
We further require that …rm C employs a pricing strategy that earns nonnegative expected pro…ts at any point in time; e¤ectively, …rm C cannot commit to o¤er a pricing schedule that may become suboptimal (relative to withdrawing the bid) at some point in the future. 29 This schedule is potentially an improvement over the static o¤er, because it may induce less productive …rms to sell earlier at lower prices, thereby reducing the overall information rent that …rm C is paying. However, similar to our earlier results, Proposition 7 shows that the private solution is still not viable. We …rst establish that, given any possible equilibrium pricing schedule, the equilibrium time of sale is increasing in …rm type. We then show that for reasonable classes of equilibria, there does not exist an equilibrium where …rms are purchased with positive probability and …rms earn non-negative pro…ts.
Proposition 7 We have the following results.
1. Given fp 1 ( ) ; p 2 ( ; )g, the equilibrium time of accepting the o¤ er is monotonically increasing in …rm type.
2. In any subsequent war-of-attrition game with common knowledge that one …rm is strictly stronger than the other, we restrict attention to the equilibrium outcome in which the weaker …rm exits immediately. Then, in the game with time-varying o¤ ering prices and without commitment, the buyer's expected pro…ts are strictly negative in situations in which …rms are sold with positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Here is a sketch of the argument. Given that the equilibrium time of sale is increasing in productivity, we need to consider two cases. First, suppose that two …rms sell their assets at di¤erent times. Then, right after …rm i accepts the o¤er it is common knowledge that …rm j is more productive than …rm C. For this subgame, we restrict attention to the equilibrium outcome where the stronger …rm j stays while the weaker …rm C exits immediately. Firm C therefore incurs a loss: it pays a positive price for …rm i but never recoups any pro…t. Second, suppose that both …rms accept C's o¤er at the same time. This situation involves a sequence of o¤ers and di¤erent types pool over time. For example, at time t 1 ; types [0; 1 ] sell the …rm, at t 2 ; types ( 1 ; 2 ] and so on. This game will terminate in a subgame identical to the static bidding game studied in Section 6, but with the productivity distribution truncated from below. Therefore …rm C incurs losses in the last subgame, which violates the no commitment requirement.
Mergers and acquisitions
A related channel to the Coasian solution are mergers and acquisitions, in which it is …rms in the industry that acquire each other. Firms in the industry do not know which …rm is stronger, and face a similar adverse selection problem as the outside buyer in the Coasian solution considered above. In addition, the o¤er itself can be used as a signal of buyer's productivity and therefore subject to manipulation, making e¢ cient exits impossible (Cramton, 1992) . Therefore it is unclear whether the possibility of acquisitions within the industry reduces information frictions relative to the Coasian solution. An explicit analysis of acquisitions necessarily involves repeated bargaining with asymmetric information and is nontrivial to analyze in our framework (see, for example, Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2010, for a model with one-sided asymmetric information). To sum up, private solutions to the war of attrition face potential market breakdown due to asymmetric information, providing a rationale for government intervention with a debt tax subsidy.
Conclusion
Allowing corporations to deduct interest payments from corporate taxes is a large government subsidy to debt …nancing. Such subsidies are common around the world and introduce a large wedge between the cost of equity and debt (Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 2005) . In spite of the role of debt …nancing in the recent crisis, and the magnitude of the subsidy for this …nancing choice, the welfare consequences of subsidizing debt have received very little attention in the literature.
Contrary to practice, the theoretical literature implies that debt and equity should be treated equally, or that debt should be taxed more heavily than equity, if industries experience temporary shocks that lead to collateral based spillovers. We show that, on the other hand, when economies experience shocks that leave some industries permanently obsolete, debt …nancing generates welfare by facilitating e¢ cient exit. Whether the debt subsidy should be abolished, as has been proposed several times, therefore depends on the magnitude of these costs and bene…ts. Beyond simply providing a rationale for subsidizing corporate debt …nancing, our model naturally rationalizes the seemingly ad hoc feature of the U.S. tax system that targets the subsidy at debt securities, which generate a con ‡ict of interest between debt and equity regarding …rm liquidation.
The recent …nancial crisis has also spurred an extensive debate on subsidizing debt …nancing of …nancial intermediaries (e.g. Admati et al, 2011; Kashyap et al, 2010) . Our model does not distinguish between …nancial intermediaries and other …rms, so it can, in principle, also be applied to …nancial intermediaries. Given that …nancial intermediaries are more vulnerable to …re sales externalities than industrial …rms (Diamond and Rajan, 2010; Stein, 2011) , it is more likely that in their case the cost of subsidizing debt outweighs the bene…t. Our model does not speak to the optimallity of another large interest tax subsidy: the mortgage tax deduction. In our model the corporate debt tax subsidy is trying to resolve the ine¢ ciently slow exit of …rms in declining industries. It is not clear that there is a mapping from our model to residential home ownership.
In fact, the current literature suggests that homeowner bankruptcy generates negative spillovers on other homeowners (e.g. Campbell, et al, 2010) .
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A Appendix A: Proofs
For clarity of exposition we recap some of the notation: G (t) is the cumulative distribution function of equilibrium exit time in the war of attrition. For …rm , given its exit strategy t and debt level b, the debt value is
and its equity value is
As a result, the …rm value in the …nancing stage can also be written as
This expression is intuitive: …rm value are the cash ‡ows of the …rm G (t) k R t 0 (1 G (x)) dx plus the expected debt tax subsidies b 1 G (t). Recall the optimal exit time T ( ; b) 2 arg max t2[0;1) E ( ; b; t) where E ( ; b; t) is given in (22). The total payo¤ of the equity holder who chooses b is:
Focus on the equilibrium exit time range 0; T where the upper bound T may take the value of 1 (in equilibrium it will). The following preliminary lemma shows that in equilibrium G (t) is well behaved.
Lemma 5 G (t) is continuous and strictly increasing for t 2 0; T . Proof. For G (t) to be strictly increasing we need to show that G (t) < G (t 0 ) for 0 t < t 0 T . Suppose not; then no types exit between t and t 0 . But types who exit at t 0 have a strictly pro…table deviation to t+ t 0 t 2 , which saves …ghting costs of k t 0 t 2 but does not a¤ ect the bene…t of winning; a contradiction. This argument implies that in equilibrium, at any point in time some types are exiting in expectation. Now suppose that G (t) involves upward jumps, and w.l.o.g. say that G (t + ) > G (t) (recall that we take the convention that G is always left continuous). Then types exiting at t pro…t from waiting a bit longer: for an arbitrarily small increase in exit time they obtain a discrete increase in the winning probability and an arbitrarily small increase in the …ghting cost:
(1 G (t)) dx > 0:
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, and b enter E ( ; b; t) in (22) only through the e¤ective strength b. Therefore if arg max t2[0;1) E ( ; b; t) is a singleton then our claim that T is a function of b follows. If arg max t2[0;1) E ( ; b; t) is a non-singleton set, then equity holders …nd it optimal to choose the largest exit time, because D (b; t) = b 1 G (t) is strictly increasing in t as implied by 5. As in the main text we now denote the optimal exit time by T ( b). To prove monotonicity, consider 1 b 1 and 2 b 2 with 1 b 1 ( 2 b 2 ) > 0, and denote their optimal exit times by T 1 = T ( 1 b 1 ) and T 2 = T ( 2 b 2 ). We show that T 1 T 2 , and T 1 > T 2 if G (T i ) 2 (0; 1), i.e., T i 2 0; T .
We …rst show weak monotonicity,
Using (22), the above inequality implies that G (t 1 ) G (t 2 ), contradicting Lemma 5. Now we rule out the case that T 1 = T 2 = t 2 0; T . Recall that
The optimallity of t for 2 implies that
(1 G (x)) dx for any :
By taking positive and negative 's, it is easy to show that G is di¤erentiable with
which implies that 1 with debt b 1 strictly prefers to wait longer than t. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof for Lemma 2
We prove the lemma in two steps.
Step 1. First, we show that in equilibrium B ( ) is increasing in . Suppose not. Then there exist 1 < 2 , whose corresponding debt choices B ( 1 ) and B ( 2 ) are such that
Lemma 1 implies that T ( 1 B ( 1 )) T ( 2 B ( 2 )) : If both …rms choose corner values T or 0 in equilibrium then T ( 1 B ( 1 )) = T ( 2 B ( 2 )). First consider the case of T so both types win the war of attrition for sure; then 1 can choose a higher debt 1 2 + B ( 2 ) > B ( 1 ) to obtain a larger debt tax subsidy but still win the war of attrition for sure. Second, if both types withdraw immediately and therefore obtain zero, 2 can borrow nothing and get a strictly positive payo¤. Lemma 1 then implies that
The optimallity of the debt choice implies that V ( ; B ( )) V ( ; x) for x 6 = B ( ) with V given in (23). In particular, consider the deviations such that 1 ( 2 ) chooses debt to have the e¤ective strength of 2 ( 1 ) in equilibrium; i.e., 2 deviates to choose b 0 2 = 2 1 + B ( 1 ) and 1 chooses b 0
( 1 ) > 0; and due to (24), b 0 1 > B ( 1 ) > 0. Therefore both deviations are feasible. Applying the optimallity of equilibrium debt choices to these deviations, we have
Combining both inequalities gives
We now show that this inequality cannot hold. Lemma 1 shows that the exit time T depends on the e¤ective strength b only:
T ( 1 ; B ( 1 )) = T ( 2 ; 2 1 + B ( 1 )) = T ( 1 B ( 1 )) and T ( 2 ; B ( 2 )) = T ( 1 ; 1 2 + B ( 2 )) = T ( 2 B ( 2 )) :
Then (23) implies that
From Lemma 1 we know that T ( 1 B ( 1 )) > T ( 2 B ( 2 )). Moreover, because G (t) is strictly increasing in t (Lemma 1), G (T ( 1 B ( 1 ) )) > G (T ( 2 B ( 2 ))). As a result, the term in (25) is
Step 2. We show that in equilibrium B ( ) is strictly increasing in . Suppose not; then there exists an interval [ 1 ; 2 ] with 2 > 1 such that T ( B ( )) = t for all 2 [ 1 ; 2 ]. Then any type in this interval can reduce debt by and exit a bit later than t (exit time is strictly monotone in b from Lemma 1). This leads to a strictly pro…table deviation: the …rm obtains at least a discrete gain in the winning probability by winning over types in the interval [ 1 ; 2 ], while only sacri…cing debt tax subsidies in the order of .
A.3 Proof for Proposition 1
Using Lemma 2 we can follow Bulow and Klemperer (1999) to derive equilibrium exit times in the war of attrition. The argument is almost identical to Bulow and Klemperer (1999) by simply replacing the productivity by B ( ), such that
The only technical di¤erence is that B ( ) might contain upward jumps. At these points, the derivative of exit time with respect to is not continuous. More speci…cally, without loss of generality, say that B > B ( ). Then at , we have
However, the set of points with jumps in B ( ) must be of zero Lebesgue measure, because B ( ) is a monotone function. Therefore, if we show thatT ( ; B ( )) is Lipschitz continuous, thenT ( ; B ( )) is absolute continuous and therefore (7) holds (Royden, 1988) . To show Lipschitz continuity, choose any 2 ; . We know that the ( 
A.4 Proof for Theorem 1
The proof for Theorem 1 comprises several steps. We …rst establish continuity and di¤erentiability of the equilibrium debt schedule B ( ).
Lemma 6 The debt schedule B ( ) is continuous on ; . As a result, without loss of generality we assume B ( ) to be continuous on ; . Proof. Suppose that B ( ) involves downward jumps at (weak monotonicity of B ( ) in Lemma 2 rules out upward jump immediately). There are two sub-cases.
First suppose that B > B ( ), i.e., B ( ) is right continuous only. Then can borrow B B ( ) =2 more, while still maintaining its ranking in the war of attrition game. Due to Proposition 1, his optimal exit time t is unchanged. Then from (6), this deviation gives a discrete gain in debt tax subsidies without any other losses. Now consider the situation where B ( ) > B + , i.e., B ( ) is left continuous. Then type + can deviate to borrow B ( ) and vice versa. Optimallity implies that
The …rst term is positive and at the order of O (1) according to the argument in the …rst case ( only loses the debt subsidy because the deviation does not a¤ ect its exit time). The second term is at the order of because exit time is continuous. As a result, V ( + ; B ( )) > V + ; B + which implies that the deviation is strictly pro…table.
The above argument does not apply to B ( ). It is because the …rm in equilibrium exits immediately and the exact debt amount raised by is undetermined. Instead, we will use the continuity at to determine B ( ) in the next lemma. QED.
Lemma 7 The debt schedule B ( ) is di¤ erentiable for ; and satis…es
Proof. Consider type ; by revealed preference the equilibrium payo¤ is higher than taking B ( ) + , i.e., (recall the de…nition of v ( ; ; ) in (23))
Let^ be the type such that^
Because B ( ) is strictly increasing and continuous, such^ < must exist, and ^ > 0 converges to zero when converges to zero. Then we have
Note that from (27) we havê
Therefore, we have
Applying the similar (but opposite) argument to deviation of B ( ) implies that
Combining both (29) and (30), we know that B ( ) is di¤ erentiable and satis…es the ODE (26).
The general closed-form solution for the ODE (26) is (with C being an arbitrary constant)
where the last equality uses integration by parts. Since F ( ) = 0, any solution with C 6 = 0 explodes at . Therefore C = 0 and Now consider a deviation to debt level b > B ( ). We want to show that the marginal incentive to reduce debt at the deviation is positive, i.e., V b ( ; b) < 0. From continuity of B ( ) we can …nd 0 with B 0 who has the same e¤ective strength
Because B ( ) is increasing in equilibrium (Proposition 2), 0 < which also implies that b > B 0 . Also, their exit time is the same as well
The proof for the negative deviation in debt is analogous. These two results implies that the FOC is su¢ cient for optimallity and uniquely determines the equilibrium debt schedule.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
for both^ > and^ < . This immediately implies that B ( ) = 0. QED.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Direct calculation yields that
and
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Direct calculation yields dS( )
B Appendix B: Duration of Distress
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We have given the main argument of how we derive the equilibrium debt schedule and equilibrium exit times in the main text. The only thing is left to show is the existence and uniqueness of threshold^ . Because the right hand side of the equation kT d = k b T ^ +^ B ^ is strictly increasing in^ , uniqueness follows.
Because the right hand side is increasing from to k b
Otherwise,^ = ; and the solution is the same as in the benchmark model. Finally, the comparative statics with respect to and T d are straightforward.
B.2 Characterization of threshold
Here we solve analytically for the threshold type^ for the distribution F ( ) = : Then B ( ; ) = + for <^ . Denote the equilibrium exit time without a debt subsidy by kT 0 ^ ( ) +^ ( ) = + kT d :
One can calculate the increasing function on the left hand side kT (y) + y as ( 2 F 1 is the hypergeometric function)
kT (y) + y = Z y 0
x 1
x dx + y = y 2 F 1 1; 1 ; 1 + 1 ; y + (1 ) y:
Thus given we can easily solve for^ ( ) numerically. Also, the total welfare is
C Appendix C: Asymmetric Information in Financing C.1 Proof of Lemma 3
We use the generalized envelope theorem in Milgrom and Segal (2002) . For E ( ; b; t), treat as the parameter and t is the choice variable, while b is just some index. Then
Because G (t) is strictly increasing (Lemma 5), and from 1 we know that T y; B 0 < T (y; B ( )) for any type y. Then:
Therefore the equilibrium debt schedule B ( ) is non-increasing in . It follows that B ( ) is strictly increasing in :
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4
For any , such that B ( ) 0 the …rm makes a loss even conditional on winning the war of attrition for any positive exit time. Independent of the strategies of other …rms, these …rms leave instantaneously. For su¢ ciently productive types such that >^ inf f : B ( ) > 0g Lemma 3 guarantees that the order of e¤ective strength in the war of attrition is the same as the order of productivity. We can then apply the proof of Proposition 1.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Result 1. Without the tax subsidy, = 0, the unique equilibrium is all-equity …nancing, i.e., B ( ) = 0 for all :
Consider a …rm , which borrows B ( ) = b > 0, with optimal exit time t = T ( b) in the war of attrition game. Suppose that its debt is fairly priced by the bank (e.g., in a separating equilibrium), so that D (b) = G (T ( ; b)) b (setting = 0 in (4)). Therefore, by summing up (2) and (19), and using (23) the equity holder's ex ante value is
to be the …rm value without a tax subsidy, given productivity and exit time t; note that the …rm value is independent of b. Importantly, however, T = arg max t E ( ; b; t; = 0), so T does not maximize the …rm value V ( ; t). Now consider the deviation of setting b = 0; then the equity holder will take another optimal exit strategy, say T , such that
that maximizes …rm value directly and V ( ; T ) V ( ; T ) : From Lemma 1 we know that T 6 = T ; therefore V ( ; T ) > V ( ; T ). As a result, the equity holder prefers zero debt …nancing.
If the equilibrium of the …nancing game is pooling in a given region, then there always exists a type whose debt price is below the fair price G (T ) b D (b). Then
Result 2. The exit times follow straight from Lemma 4. Result 3. The social planner chooses a strictly positive > 0. We show that the social planner can improve welfare by setting a positive tax subsidy > 0 to support a pooling equilibrium with B ( ) = b for all 2 . In a pooling equilibrium all types propose debt level b to the bank, D ( ) = b, and obtain D (b) from the bank. 30 Welfare for a given level of debt is closely related to welfare in the baseline model from 17. The only di¤erence is that only types who choose less debt than their productivity > b generate positive welfare, and impose cost on other …rms.
First note that welfare in 32 equals welfare in the baseline model 17, for > b 0: Then increasing b marginally above 0 clearly leads to a welfare increase since @S
Further we can also show that welfare increases for a marginal increase of b above :
Note that a pooling equilibrium satis…es the requirement from Lemma 1 that B ( ) is not increasing in . We support the equilibrium with the belief that o¤-equilibrium deviations are from the least productive type : Note that the tax subsidy a¤ects all …rms the same way through the debt pricing D (b), thus the most productive type has the highest incentive to deviate from the pooling equilibrium. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the pooling condition to exist is then for the not to deviate, which is
which holds for su¢ ciently high . QED.
D Appendix D: Coasian Solution
D.1 Proof for Proposition 6
For simplicity we assume = 0; where is …nite.
Monotonicity in bid rejection. Suppose not; then there exists 1 < 2 , such that 1 rejects the o¤er and 2 accepts the o¤er. Let Y ( N = n Y ) be the set of all types who accept (reject) the o¤er, and let Pr (Y ) = Pr ( 2 Y ). Denote by V ( ; 1 ; 2 ) the payo¤ to …rm after sale decisions become public, where …rm believes that its opponent is from 1 , while the opponent believes that she is playing against a …rm from 2 . The incentive compatibility conditions for both types require that (recall that the rejection of 1 implies that 1 strictly prefers rejection)
Combining and rearranging, we require that
In a war of attrition, 2 can follow 1 exit strategy and freely dispose 2 1 > 0. Thus V ( 1 ; Y ; N ) V ( 2 ; Y ; N ) 0 and V ( 2 ; N ; N ) V ( 1 ; N ; N ) 0, and (33) cannot hold, a contradiction.
Existence and uniqueness. Fix p and let^ be the solution to^ F ^ = p. We show that the …rm i =^ is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. By accepting, it always obtains p. Suppose …rm i rejects the o¤er. If the other …rm, j ; rejects, then j >^ which occurs with probability 1 F ^ . Firm i enters the war of attrition with this stronger opponent and her expected payo¤ is zero. If the other …rm accepts the o¤er, with probability F ^ , in equilibrium …rm C acquires the assets, but does not enter the war, and …rm i wins the war and obtains^ . Therefore the indi¤erence condition implies that^ F ^ = p.
Because^ F ^ is strictly monotone in^ , the cuto¤^ is unique, and this equilibrium is unique. Now we verify that the proposed strategies comprise an equilibrium. Given the monotonicity of the bid rejection strategy, we know that it is optimal for types below^ to accept the o¤er and types above^ to reject it. Now we verify that the war of attrition game is indeed an equilibrium. If both …rms reject the o¤er, the war of attrition is one with the truncated type distribution with lower bound^ . If one …rm rejects and the other accepts, then it is obvious that the …rm which rejected the o¤er and saw its opponent accepting it, will enter the war (because in equilibrium she expects …rm C to immediately fold). Finally, after buying a weak …rm ^ , …rm C will …nd it optimal not to enter the war of attrition. On this o¤-equlibrium path the opponent plays according to standard war of attrition in Proposition 2 with lower bound^ as a common belief. In this game^ drops out immediately, therefore …rm C with ^ …nds it optimal to exit immediately as well.
Negative expected pro…ts. Now we compute the …rm C's expected pro…ts for any p > 0. Since the bidding price p b = b F b is monotone in the equilibrium cuto¤ type^ , …rm C can e¤ectively choose b .
The total equilibrium expected pro…ts as a function of b are:
Here, the …rst term captures the situation where both …rms accept the o¤er. Firm C pays p b to each …rm and internalizes externalities by closing the less pro…table …rm. In the situation where only one …rm accepts, which occurs with probability 2F b 1 F b , …rm C pays p b to one …rm, and immediately exits. When both …rms reject …rm C has zero payo¤s. Since …rm C is e¤ectively choosing b ; the …rst order impact of b on pro…ts is @
and strictly negative for b > 0. Further, since b = 0 = 0, the strictly negative slope implies that b < 0 for all positive b (i.e. p > 0). Q.E.D.
D.2 Proof of Corollary 2
We impose o¤-equilibrium beliefs, that closely correspond to the ones for unconditional o¤ers: In equilibrium the strong …rm i >^ rejects the bid and the the weak …rm j <^ chooses to sell. Because bids are conditional, the bid fails. Suppose that j who is now revealed to be weak-enters the second stage war of attrition instead of exiting immediately as the equilibrium strategy suggests. We assume that in the war of attrition the strong opponent forgets that the weak …rm has reveled itself to be weak and treats the weak …rm as the one who should have rejected the bid. The equilibrium is monotone even under this harsh o¤-equilibrium belief against monotone strategies. Monotonicity in rejecting strategy. First we show that for 2 > 1 , if 1 rejects the o¤er then 2 rejects it as well. We use the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 6. Suppose the strategy is not monotonic, then the incentive compatibility conditions for both types require that Pr (Y ) V ( 1 ; Y ; N ) + (1 Pr (Y )) V ( 1 ; N ; N ) > Pr (Y ) p + (1 Pr (Y )) V ( 1 ; N ; Y ) Pr (Y ) p + (1 Pr (Y )) V ( 2 ; N ; Y ) Pr (Y ) V ( 2 ; Y ; N ) + (1 Pr (Y )) V ( 2 ; N ; N )
Combine and rearrange, we require that
Under the o¤ equilibrium beliefs speci…ed in Proposition 6, once the war of attrition has started, …rms' strategies are independent of the previous decision to sell. This implies that the payo¤s to entering the war of attrition are independent of a decision to sell. As a result V (:; :; N ) = V (:; :; Y ), therefore the second line in (34) is zero. And, since 2 can freely dispose 2 1 > 0 , V ( 1 ; Y ; N ) V ( 2 ; Y ; N ) 0. Therefore (34) cannot hold and we have a contradiction. Now we describe the equilibrium: Under the o¤ equilibrium belief speci…ed in Proposition 6, there exists a unique (pure strategy) symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, given the o¤er price p, de…ne the cuto¤ b = p. All …rms below^ = p accept the bid and all …rms above^ reject the bid. If the bid fails, the …rm who accepted the bid (if there exists such a …rm) exits immediately. If both …rms reject the bid, they compete in a war of attrition with exit times in Proposition 2 with productivity distribution truncated below at^ .
We omit the proof for uniqueness of existence which is similar to that of Proposition 6 (the detailed argument is available upon request).
Negative expected pro…ts. Now we compute …rm C's expected pro…ts for any p > 0, and show that they are strictly negative. Because the o¤er is contingent, the buyer only earns pro…ts when both …rms accept the bid. Since C's pro…ts come from internalizing externalities, it will bid such that, if successful, it closes the less productive …rm. In exchange, it pays p to each …rm. Since b = p, …rm C can e¤ectively choose b . The equilibrium pro…ts are:
The marginal impact of cuto¤^ on the expected pro…ts is
D.3 Proof for Proposition 7
We …rst show that the …rm's equilibrium time of sale is increasing in …rms'type. Before either …rm i or j sell, both …rms face similar payo¤s as in (2), with two key di¤erences. First, each …rm has the option to sell to …rm C at t and receive p 1 (t). Second, whichever …rm chooses not to sell will compete with …rm C, but it can also choose to sell its asset to C for p 2 (s; t) at any time s > t. Without loss of generality, consider …rm i and suppose that its opponent's selling time distribution is G S . Because we are focusing on symmetric equilibria, G S is independent of …rm's identity. Therefore, the value of …rm with productivity and selling time t is V ( ; t) = (1 G S (t)) ( kt + p 1 (t)) +
where the …rst term is …rm i's payo¤ if she is the …rst …rm to accept C's o¤er. The second term is her payo¤ if the opponent sells …rst. In this term, the …rst part is the cost of competing with …rm j, and the second term V C ( ; x) gives the continuation value of competing with …rm C if the opponent sells itself to C at time x.
Suppose that < 0 but they choose t > t 0 in equilibrium. Then V 0 ; t 0 V 0 ; t and V ( ; t) V ( ; t 0 ). Moreover, because we break ties such that the …rm accepts an o¤er whenever indi¤erent, 31 we can show that the …rst inequality is strict: V ( ; t) > V ( ; t 0 ). Suppose that V ( ; t) = V ( ; t 0 ). Because t > t 0 , …rm must strictly prefer rejecting at t 0 , i.e. there exits some later selling time t > t 0 such that V ( ; t ) > V ( ; t 0 ) = V ( ; t). This contradicts the fact that V ( ; t) is the optimal selling strategy.
Combining the inequalities we obtain
Because of free disposal V C ( ; x)
Then V 0 ; t 0 V ( ; t 0 ) V 0 ; t V ( ; t) because t 0 < t. This contradicts with (36), and therefore the time to accept the o¤er is increasing in …rm productivity. Now we show that …rm C cannot earn positive pro…ts. If …rms sell to C at di¤erent times, it is common knowledge that the …rst …rm C bought is strictly weaker. We focus subgame equilibria in which strictly weaker …rms exit immediately. Therefore …rm C exits immediately and loses money in paying the …rm who sold …rst. Firm C still might be able to earn positive pro…ts if it can induce both …rms to sell at the same time. Because of monotonicity, at any point in time, the distribution of types that has not sold yet is the original type distribution but potentially truncated from below at some b : Consider the last time at which both …rms might sell. This corresponds to the highest cuto¤ b . Since b is bounded above by , such a time exists. Then we can evaluate the pro…t of …rm C at this highest cuto¤. Wlog, …rm C must o¤er a non-zero priceotherwise no …rms will sell. This subgame corresponds to the static time-0 game analyzed in Proposition 6, and the same argument as in Proposition 6 implies that …rm C will incur a strictly negative pro…t at b . This violates the requirement that …rm C cannot commit to o¤er prices that incur a negative expected pro…t. QED.
